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Abstract
Previous studies suggest that factual learning, that is, learning from obtained outcomes, is
biased, such that participants preferentially take into account positive, as compared to nega-
tive, prediction errors. However, whether or not the prediction error valence also affects
counterfactual learning, that is, learning from forgone outcomes, is unknown. To address
this question, we analysed the performance of two groups of participants on reinforcement
learning tasks using a computational model that was adapted to test if prediction error
valence influences learning. We carried out two experiments: in the factual learning experi-
ment, participants learned from partial feedback (i.e., the outcome of the chosen option
only); in the counterfactual learning experiment, participants learned from complete feed-
back information (i.e., the outcomes of both the chosen and unchosen option were dis-
played). In the factual learning experiment, we replicated previous findings of a valence-
induced bias, whereby participants learned preferentially from positive, relative to negative,
prediction errors. In contrast, for counterfactual learning, we found the opposite valence-
induced bias: negative prediction errors were preferentially taken into account, relative to
positive ones. When considering valence-induced bias in the context of both factual and
counterfactual learning, it appears that people tend to preferentially take into account infor-
mation that confirms their current choice.
Author summary
While the investigation of decision-making biases has a long history in economics and
psychology, learning biases have been much less systematically investigated. This is sur-
prising as most of the choices we deal with in everyday life are recurrent, thus allowing
learning to occur and therefore influencing future decision-making. Combining beha-
vioural testing and computational modeling, here we show that the valence of an out-
come biases both factual and counterfactual learning. When considering factual and
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counterfactual learning together, it appears that people tend to preferentially take into
account information that confirms their current choice. Increasing our understanding of
learning biases will enable the refinement of existing models of value-based decision-
making.
Introduction
Goal-directed behaviour is composed of two core components [1]: one component is the deci-
sion-making process that starts with representing the available options and terminates in
selecting the option with the highest expected value; the second component is reinforcement
learning (RL), through which outcomes are used to refine value expectations, in order to
improve decision-making. Human decision-making is subject to biases (i.e. deviations from
the normative prescriptions), such as the framing effect [2]. While the investigation of deci-
sion-making biases has a long history in economics and psychology, learning biases have been
much less systematically investigated [3]. This is surprising as most of the decisions we deal
with in everyday life are experience-based and choice contexts are recurrent, thus allowing
learning to occur and therefore influencing future decision-making. In addition, it is impor-
tant to investigate learning biases as there is evidence that RL processes play a role in psychiat-
ric conditions and maladaptive economic behaviour [4,5].
Standard RL algorithms learn action-outcome associations directly from obtained out-
comes on a trial and error basis [6]. We refer to this direct form of learning as “factual learn-
ing”. Despite the fact that standard models, built around the notion of computational and
statistical optimality, prescribe that an agent should learn equally well from positive and nega-
tive obtained outcomes [7–9], previous studies have consistently shown that humans display a
significant valence-induced bias. This bias generally goes in the direction of preferential learn-
ing from positive, compared to negative, outcome prediction errors [10–14]. This learning
asymmetry could represent a RL counterpart of the “good news/bad news” effect that is
observed for probabilistic reasoning [15].
However, human RL cannot be reduced simply to learning from obtained outcomes. Other
sources of information can be successfully integrated in order to improve performance and RL
has a multi-modular structure [16]. Amongst the more sophisticated learning processes that
have already been demonstrated in humans is counterfactual learning. Counterfactual learning
refers to the ability to learn from forgone outcomes (i.e. the outcomes of the option(s) that
were not chosen) [17,18]. Whether or not a valence-induced bias also affects counterfactual
learning remains unknown.
To address this question, we ran two experiments involving instrumental learning and
computational model-based analyses. Two groups of healthy adults performed variants of a
repeated two-armed bandit task involving probabilistic outcomes [19,20] (Fig 1A). We ana-
lysed the data using a modified Rescorla-Wagner model that assumes different learning rates
for positive and negative, and factual and counterfactual, prediction errors (Fig 1B) [21,22].
The first experiment aimed to replicate previous findings of a “positivity bias” at the level of
factual learning. In this first experiment, participants were presented only with the obtained
outcome (chosen outcome: RC; Fig 1A) [10]. In the second experiment, in order to investigate
whether or not counterfactual learning rates are also affected by the valence of prediction
errors, we used a variant of the same instrumental learning task, in which participants were
also presented with the forgone outcome (unchosen outcome: RU; Fig 1B). Our design allowed
us to test three competing hypotheses concerning the effect of valence on counterfactual
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learning (Fig 2A). The first hypothesis–“no bias”—was that unlike factual learning, counter-
factual learning would be unbiased. The second hypothesis,—“positivity bias”—was that fac-
tual and counterfactual learning would present the same valence-induced bias, such that
Fig 1. Behavioural task variants and computational model. (A) Behavioural task variants. In Experiment 1 (leftmost panel) participants were shown
only the outcome of the chosen option. In Experiment 2 (rightmost panel) participants were shown the outcome of both the chosen and the unchosen
options. (B) Computational models. The schematic summarises the value update stage of our computational model. The model contains two
computational modules, a factual learning module (in red) to learn from chosen outcomes (RC) and a counterfactual learning module (in blue) to learn from
unchosen outcomes (RU) (note that the counterfactual learning module does not apply to Experiment 1). Chosen (QC) and unchosen (QU) option values
are updated with delta rules that use different learning rates for positive and negative factual (PEC) and counterfactual prediction errors (PEU).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005684.g001
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Fig 2. Factual and counterfactual learning biases. (A) Predicted results. Based on previous studies we expected that in Experiment 1 factual learning
would display a “positivity” bias (i.e. the learning rate for the chosen positive outcomes would be relatively higher than that of the chosen negative
outcomes (aþc > a c ; note that in Experiment 1 the “positivity” and the “confirmation” bias are not discernible). In Experiment 2, one possibility was that this
“positivity” bias would extend to counterfactual learning, whereby positive outcomes would be over-weighted regardless of whether the outcome was
chosen or unchosen (“valence” bias) (aþu > a u ). Another possibility was that counterfactual learning would present an opposite bias, whereby the learning
rate for unchosen negative outcomes was higher than the learning rate of unchosen positive outcomes (aþu < a u ) (“confirmation” bias). (B) Actual results.
Learning rate analysis of Experiment 1 data replicated previous findings, demonstrating that factual learning presents a “positivity” bias. Learning rate
analysis of Experiment 2 indicated that counterfactual learning was also biased, in a direction that was consistent with a “confirmation” bias. ***P<0.001
and *P<0.05, two-tailed paired t-test.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005684.g002
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positive counterfactual prediction errors would be more likely to be taken into account than
negative counterfactual prediction errors. In this scenario, factual and counterfactual learning
biases would be consequences of a more general positivity bias, in which positive prediction
errors have a greater impact on learning, regardless of whether the option was chosen or not.
Finally, the third hypothesis–“confirmation bias”—was that valence would affect factual and
counterfactual learning in opposing directions, such that negative unchosen prediction errors
would be more likely to be taken into account than positive unchosen prediction errors. In
this scenario, factual and counterfactual learning biases would be consequences of a more gen-
eral confirmation bias, in which outcomes that support the current choice are preferentially
taken into account.
Results
Behavioural task and full computational model
To investigate both factual and counterfactual reinforcement learning biases, we designed an
instrumental task based on a previous paradigm, in which we showed a significant positivity
bias in factual learning [10]. Here, we used two variants of the task, which differed in that the
task used in Experiment 1 involved participants (N = 20) being shown only the outcome of
their chosen option, whereas in Experiment 2 (N = 20) the outcome of the unchosen option
was also displayed (Fig 1A). To test our hypotheses concerning valence-induced learning
biases (Fig 2A) we fitted the data with a Rescorla-Wagner model assuming different learning
rates for positive and negative outcomes, which respectively elicit positive and negative predic-
tion errors (Fig 1B). The algorithm used to explain Experiment 1 data involved two learning
rates for obtained outcomes (aþc and a
 
c for positive and negative prediction errors of the
obtained outcomes, respectively). In addition to the obtained outcome learning rates, the algo-
rithm used to explain Experiment 2 data also involved two learning rates for forgone outcomes
(aþu and a
 
u for positive and negative prediction errors of the forgone outcomes, respectively).
Learning rate analysis
Replicating previous findings, in Experiment 1 we found that the positive factual learning rate
(aþc ) was significantly higher than the negative one (a
 
c ; T(19) = 2.4; P = 0.03) (Fig 2B, left). In
Experiment 2, we analysed learning rates using a repeated-measure ANOVA with prediction
error valence (positive or negative) and prediction error type (factual or counterfactual) as
within-subjects factors. Falsifying the “positivity bias” hypothesis, the ANOVA revealed no
main effect of prediction error valence (F(1,19) = 0.2; P>0.6). We also did not find any effect of
prediction error type, indicating that, on average, factual and counterfactual learning were simi-
lar (F(1,19) = 0.5; P>0.4). Consistent with the “confirmation bias” hypothesis, we found a signif-
icant interaction between valence and type (F(1,19) = 119.2; P = 1.3e-9). Post-hoc tests indicated
that the interaction was driven by effects of valence on both factual (aþc > a
 
c ; T(19) = 3.6; P =
0.0017) and counterfactual learning rates (a u > a
þ
u ; T(19) = 6.2; P = 5.8e-06) (Fig 2B, right).
To verify the robustness of this result in the context of different reward contingencies, we
analysed learning rates in each task condition separately. In both experiments, our task
included three different conditions (S1 Fig): a “Symmetric” condition, in which both options
were associated with a 50% chance of getting a reward; an “Asymmetric” condition, in which
one option was associated with a 75% chance of getting a reward, whereas the other option
was associated with only a 25% chance; and a “Reversal” condition, in which one option was
initially associated with a 83% chance of getting a reward and the other option was associated
with a 17% chance of getting a reward, but after 12 trials the reward contingencies were
Confirmation bias in human reinforcement learning
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reversed. For Experiment 1, we analysed factual learning rates using a repeated-measure
ANOVA with prediction error valence (positive and negative) and task condition (Symmetric,
Asymmetric and Reversal) as within-subjects factors (S1B Fig). Confirming the aggregate
result, the ANOVA showed a significant main effect of valence (F(1,19) = 26.4, P = 5.8e-5), but
no effect of condition (F(2,38) = 0.7, P>0.5), and, crucially, no valence by condition interac-
tion (F(2,38) = 0.8, P>0.4). For Experiment 2, we analysed factual and counterfactual learning
rates using a repeated-measure ANOVA with prediction error valence (positive and negative),
prediction error type (factual or counterfactual) and condition (Symmetric, Asymmetric and
Reversal) as within-subjects factors (S1C Fig). Confirming the aggregate result, the ANOVA
showed no effect of prediction error type (F(1,19) = 0.0, P>0.9), no effect of valence (F(1,19) =
0.3, P>0.5), but a significant valence by type interaction (F(1,19) = 162.9, P = 9.1e-11). We
also found an effect of condition (F(2,38) = 5.1, P = 0.01), reflecting lower average learning
rates in the Reversal compared to the Asymmetric condition (T(19) = 2.99; P = 0.007), which
was not modulated by valence (F(2,38) = 0.2, P>0.7), or type (F(2,38) = 1.2, P>0.3). The
three-way interaction was not significant (F(2,38) = 1.8, P>.1), indicating that learning biases
were robust across different task contingencies.
Dimensionality reduction with model comparison
To further test our hypotheses and verify theparsimony of our findings, we ran a model compari-
son analysis including the ‘Full’ model (i.e., the model with four learning rates; Fig 1C, right)
and reduced, alternative versions of it (Fig 3A). The first alternative model was obtained by
reducing the number of learning rates along the dimension of the outcome type (factual or coun-
terfactual). This ‘Information’ model has only two learning rates: one for the obtained outcomes
(αC) and another for the forgone outcomes (αU). The second alternative model was obtained by
reducing the number of learning rates along the dimension of the outcome valence (positive or
negative). This ‘Valence’ model has only two learning rates (one for the positive outcomes (α+)
and another for the negative outcomes (α-)) and should win according to the “positivity bias”
hypothesis. Finally, the third alternative model was obtained by reducing the learning rate as a
function of the outcome event being confirmatory (positive obtained or negative forgone) or dis-
confirmatory (negative obtained or positive forgone). This ‘Confirmation’ model has only two
learning rates (one for confirmatory outcomes (αCON) and another for the disconfirmatory out-
comes (αDIS)) and should win according to the “confirmation bias” hypothesis.
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) analysis indicated that the ‘Full’ model better
accounted for the data compared to both the ‘Information’ and the ‘Valence’ models (both
comparisons: T(19)>4.2; P<0.0005; Table 1). However the ‘Confirmation’ model better
accounted for the data compared to the ‘Full’ model (T(19) = 9.9; P = 6.4e-9). The posterior
probability (PP) of belonging to each model, calculated for each subject, (i.e., the averaged
individual model attributions) of the ‘Confirmation’ model was higher than chance (.0.25 for a
model space including 4 models; T(19) = 13.5; P = 3.3e-11) and higher than the posterior prob-
ability all the other models (all comparisons: T(19)>9.0; P<2.1e-8) (Fig 3B). The learning rate
for confirmatory outcomes was significantly higher than that for disconfirmatory outcomes
(αCON>αDIS; T(19) = 11.7; P = 3.9e-10) (Fig 3C). These results support the “confirmation
bias” hypothesis and further indicate that, at least at the behavioural level, chosen and uncho-
sen outcomes may be processed by the same learning systems.
Comparison between the learning curves and the model estimates
To evaluate the capacity of our models to reproduce the learning curves, we plotted and ana-
lysed the trial-by-trial model estimates of choice probabilities (Fig 4) [23]. The model estimates
Confirmation bias in human reinforcement learning
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005684 August 11, 2017 6 / 22
were generated using the best fitting set of parameters for each individual and model. In the
Symmetric condition (where there is no correct response), we considered the preferred option
choice rate (i.e., the option/symbol that was chosen more than >50%). In the Asymmetric
Fig 3. Dimensionality reduction with model comparison. (A) Model space. The figure represents how the number of parameters (learning rates) are
reduced moving from the ‘Full’ model to more simple ones. (B) Model comparison. The panel represents the posterior probability (PP) of the models, the
calculation of which is based on the BIC, which penalisses model complexity. The dashed line represents random posterior probability (0.25). (C) Model
parameters. The panel represents the learning rate for the best fitting model (i.e., the ‘Confirmation’) model. αCON: learning rate for positive obtained and
negative forgone outcomes; αDIS: learning rate for negative obtained and positive forgone outcomes. ***P<0.001, two-tailed paired t-test.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005684.g003
Table 1. Model comparison. The “winning” model is the “Confirmation” model for which the learning rates are displayed in Fig 3C. The second best model
is the Full model, for which the learning rates are displayed in Fig 2B.
Model Full (5df) Information (3df) Valence (3df) Confirmation (3df) Perseveration (4df) One (2df)
BIC 162.0±13.4 178.2±13.0 180.7±11.8 155.0±13.2 165.2±13.6 179.1±11.8
PP 0.02±0.02 0.00±0.00 0.05±0.05 0.89±0.06 0.01±0.01 0.04±0.03
XP 0.00 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion; PP: posterior probability; XP: exceedance probability; df: degrees of freedom.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005684.t001
Confirmation bias in human reinforcement learning
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Fig 4. Learning curves and model estimates. (A) Task conditions. (B) and (C) Learning curves as a function of the task conditions in Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2, respectively. Each panel displays the result of the corresponding condition presented in (A). The black dots and the error bars represent
the actual data ± s.e.m. The green lines represent the model estimates of the biased models (Experiment 1: aþc 6¼ a c ; Experiment 2:αCON6¼αDIS), the grey
lines represent the model estimates of the unbiased models (Experiment 1: aþc ¼ a c ; Experiment 2: αCON = αDIS).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005684.g004
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condition we considered the correct choice rate. In the Reversal condition (where the correct
response is reversed after the first half of the trials) we considered the choice rate of the initially
more advantageous option (i.e., the correct option during the first half). Qualitative observa-
tion of the learning curves indicated that the biased models (Experiment 1: aþc 6¼ a
 
c ; Experi-
ment 2: αCON 6¼αDIS) tended to reproduce the learning curves more closely. To quantify this,
we compared the average square distance between the biased and the unbiased models (Exper-
iment 1: aþc ¼ a
 
c ; Experiment 2: αCON = αDIS). We found that the square distance was shorter
for the biased models compared to the unbiased models in both experiments (Experiment 1:
0.074 vs. 0.085, T(19) = 3.5 P = 0.0022; Experiment 2: 0.056 vs. 0.064, T(19) = 3.5 P = 0.0016).
Parameter correlation and parameter recovery
We calculated the Pearson correlation between the parameters (Fig 5A) and found no signifi-
cant correlation when correcting for multiple comparisons (corrected P value = 0.056 =
0.008; lowest uncorrected P value = 0.01, highest P2 = 0.30). The correlation between αCON
and αDIS was weak, but positive, which rules out the possibility that the significant difference
between these two learning rates was driven by an anti-correlation induced by the model fit-
ting procedure.
We then applied the same model fitting procedure to the synthetic datasets and calculated
the correlation between the true and the retrieved parameters (Fig 5B). We found that, on
average, all parameters in both experiments were well recovered (0.70 R 0.89) and that
our model fitting procedure introduced no spurious correlations between the other parameters
(|R| 0.5).
We also checked the parameter recovery for discrete sets of parameter values (S2 & S3
Figs). For Experiment 1, we simulated unbiased (aþc ¼ a
 
c ) and biased (a
þ
c > a
 
c ) participants.
For Experiment 2, we simulated unbiased (aþc ¼ a
 
c and a
þ
u ¼ a
 
u ), semi-biased (a
þ
c > a
 
c and
aþu ¼ a
 
u ) and biased (a
þ
c > a
 
c and a
þ
u > a
 
u ) participants. We simulated N = 100 virtual par-
ticipants per set of parameters. The results of these analyses are presented in the supplemen-
tary materials and confirm the capacity of our parameter optimisation procedure to correctly
recover the true parameters, regardless of the presence (or absence) of learning rate biases.
Behavioural signatures of learning biases
To investigate the behavioural consequences of the learning biases, we median-split the partici-
pants from each experiment into two groups according to their normalised learning rate dif-
ferences. We reasoned that the effects of learning biases on behavioural performance could be
highlighted by comparing participants who differed in the extent they expressed the bias itself.
Experiment 1 participants were split according to their normalised factual learning rate bias:
ðaþc   a
 
c Þ=ða
þ
c þ a
 
c Þ, from which we obtained a high (M = 0.76±0.05) and a low bias (M = 0.11±
0.14) group. Experiment 2 participants were split according their normalised confirmation bias:
½ðaþ
c
  a 
c
Þ   ðaþ
u
þ a 
u
Þ=ðaþ
c
þ a 
c
þ aþ
u
þ a 
u
Þ, from which we also obtained a high bias group
(M = 0.72±0.04) and a low bias group (M = 0.36±0.04).
From the Symmetric condition we extracted preferred choice rate as a dependent variable,
which was the choice rate of the most frequently chosen option (i.e. the option that was chosen
on>50% of trials) (Fig 6A). We hypothesised that higher biases were associated with an
increased tendency to develop a preferred choice, even in the absence of a “correct” option,
which naturally emerges from overweighting positive factual (and/or negative counterfactual)
outcomes, as observed in our previous study [10]. We submitted the preferred choice rate to
an ANOVA with experiment (1 vs. 2) and bias level (high vs. low) as between-subjects factors.
The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of bias level (F(1,36) = 8.8, P = 0.006). There
Confirmation bias in human reinforcement learning
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was no significant main effect of experiment (F(1,36) = 0.6, P>0.6) and no significant interac-
tion between experiment and bias level (F(1,36) = 0.3, P>0.5). Replicating previous findings,
the main effect of bias level was driven by higher preferred choice rate in the high, compared
to the low bias group in both Experiment 1 (T(18) = 1.8 P = 0.08) and Experiment 2 (T(18) =
2.3 P = 0.03) (Fig 6B & 6C).
From the remaining conditions we extracted the correct choice rate, which was the choice
rate of the most frequently rewarded option. In the Reversal condition, correct choice rate was
split across the first half of the trial (i.e., before the reversal of the contingencies) and second
half (i.e., after the reversal of the contingencies) (Fig 6A). We hypothesised that in the second
half of the Reversal condition, where correct choice rate depends on un-learning previous
associations based on negative factual prediction errors (and positive counterfactual prediction
errors, in Experiment 2), high bias subjects will display reduced performance. We submitted
the correct choice rate to a mixed ANOVA with experiment (1 vs. 2) and bias group (high vs.
low) as between-subjects factors, and condition (Asymmetric, Reversal: first half, and Reversal:
second half) as a within-subjects factor. There was a main effect of experiment (F(1,36) = 4.1,
P = 0.05), indicating that correct choice rate was higher in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1,
which is consistent with previous studies showing that counterfactual feedback enhances
learning[20,24]. We also found a significant effect of bias level (F(1,36) = 10.8, P = 0.002), a sig-
nificant effect of condition (F(2,72) = 99.5, P = 2.0e-16), and a significant bias level by condi-
tion interaction (F(2,72) = 9.6, P = 0.0002). Indeed, in both experiments, the correct choice
rate in the second half of the Reversal condition was lower in the high bias compared to the
low bias group (Experiment 1: T(18) = 3.9 P = 0.0003; Experiment 2: T(18) = 2.5 P = 0.02) (Fig
6B & 6C).
Importantly, we found that the temperature did not differ between low and high bias sub-
jects in Experiment 1 (low vs. high: 3.38±0.82 vs. 3.78±0.67; T(18) = 0.4, P = 0.7078) or in
Experiment 2 (low vs. high. 3.29±0.56 vs. 2.13±0.36; T(18) = 1.7, P = 0.0973). Of note, the dif-
ference in temperature goes in two different directions in the two experiments, whereas the
behavioural effects (i.e., increased preferred response rate in the Symmetric condition and
decreased performance in the second half of the Reversal condition) go in the same direction.
Finally, we used Pearson’s correlations to verify that the relevant results remained significant
when assessed as continuous variables. As predicted, the normalised learning biases were sig-
nificantly and positively correlated with the preferred choice rate in the Symmetric condition
in both experiments (Experiment 1: R = 0.54, P = 0.013; Experiment 2: R = 0.46, P = 0.040).
Similarly, the normalised learning biases were significantly and negatively correlated with the
correct choice rate in the second half of the Reversal condition (Experiment 1: R = -0.66,
P = 0.0015; Experiment 2: R = -0.47, P = 0.033).
Discussion
Two groups of healthy adult participants performed two variants of an instrumental learning
task, involving factual (Experiment 1) and counterfactual (Experiments 1 & 2) reinforcement
learning. We found that prediction error valence biased factual and counterfactual learning in
opposite directions. Replicating previous findings, we found that, when learning from obtained
outcomes (factual learning), the learning rate for positive prediction errors was higher than the
Fig 5. Parameter correlation and recovery. (A) Correlation matrix of the free parameters for Experiment 1 (left) and Experiment 2
(right). Dark blue or dark red values of R indicate a strong correlation and therefore a problem in parameter identifiability. (B) Correlation
matrix of the free parameters used to generate the simulated data (‘Fitted on real data’) and obtained by applying the parameter
estimation procedure on the simulated data (‘Fitted on simulated data’). Dark red values of R indicate a strong correlation between the
true and the retrieved parameter value and therefore a good parameter recovery.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005684.g005
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Fig 6. Behavioural signatures distinguishing “low” and “high” bias participants. (A) Task conditions. The ‘Symmetric’ condition was characterised
by a stable reward contingency and no correct option, because the two options had equal reward probabilities. The ‘Asymmetric conditions’ were also
characterised by a stable reward contingency but had a correct option, since one option had a higher reward probability than the other. The ‘Reversal’
condition was characterised by an unstable reward contingency: after 12 trials the reward probability reversed across symbols, so that the former correct
option became the incorrect one, and vice versa. Note that the number of trials refers to one session and participants performed two sessions, each
involving new pairs of stimuli (192 trials in total). (B) and (C) Behavioural results as a function of the task conditions in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2,
respectively. Each column presents the result of the corresponding condition presented in (A). In the Symmetric condition, where there was no correct
option, we calculated the “preferred choice rate”, which was the choice rate of the most frequently chosen option (by definition, this was always greater
than 0.5). In the Asymmetric and the Reversal conditions we calculated the correct choice rate. In the Reversal condition the correct choice rate was split
between the two learning phases. ***P<0.001 and *P<0.05, two-tailed paired t-test.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005684.g006
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learning rate for negative prediction errors. In contrast, when learning from forgone outcomes
(counterfactual learning), the learning rate for positive prediction errors was lower than that of
negative prediction errors. This result proved stable across different reward contingency condi-
tions and was further supported by model comparison analyses, which indicated that the most
parsimonious model was a model with different learning rates for confirmatory and disconfir-
matory events, regardless of outcome type (factual or counterfactual) and valence (positive or
negative). Finally, behavioural analyses showed that participants with a higher valence-induced
learning bias displayed poorer learning performance, specifically when it was necessary to adjust
their behaviour in response to a reversal of reward contingencies. These learning biases were
therefore significantly associated with reduced learning performance and can be considered
maladaptive in the context or our experimental tasks.
Our results demonstrated a factual learning bias, which replicates previous findings by
showing that, in simple instrumental learning tasks, participants preferentially learn from posi-
tive compared to negative prediction errors [11–13]. However, in contrast to previous studies,
in which this learning bias had no negative impact on behavioural performance (i.e., correct
choice rate and therefore final payoff), here we demonstrated that this learning bias is still pres-
ent in situations in which it has a negative impact on performance. In fact, whereas low and
high bias participants performed equally well in conditions with stable reward contingencies,
in conditions with unstable reward contingencies we found that high bias participants showed
a relatively reduced correct choice rate. When reward contingencies were changed, learning to
successfully reverse the response in the second half of the trials was mainly driven by negative
factual (and positive counterfactual) prediction errors. Thus in this case, participants display-
ing higher biases exhibited a lower correct choice rate. In other words, these learning biases
significantly undermined participants’ capacity to flexibly adapt their behaviour in changing,
uncertain environments.
In addition to reduced reversal learning, and in accordance with a previous study [10],
another behavioural feature that distinguished higher and lower bias participants was the pre-
ferred response rate in the Symmetric condition. In the Symmetric condition, both cues had
the same reward probabilities (50%), such that there was no intrinsic “correct” response. This
allowed us to calculate the preferred response rate for each participant (defined as the choice
rate of the option most frequently selected by a given participant, i.e. the option selected
in> 50% of trials). The preferred response rate can therefore be taken as a measure of the ten-
dency to overestimate the value of one cue compared to the other, in the absence of actual out-
come-based evidence. In both experiments, higher bias participants showed higher preferred
response rates, a behavioural pattern that is consistent with an increased tendency to discount
negative factual (and positive counterfactual) prediction errors. This can result in one consid-
ering a previously rewarded chosen option as better than it really is and an increased prefer-
ence for this choice. Thus, these results illustrate that the higher the learning bias for a given
participant, the higher his/her behavioural perseveration (the tendency to repeat a previous
choice), despite the possible acquisition of new evidence in the form of negative feedback.
Previous studies have been unable to distinguish whether this valence-induced factual
learning bias is a “positivity bias” or a “confirmation bias”. In other words, do participants
preferentially learn from positive prediction errors because they are positively valenced or
because the outcome confirms the choice they have just made? To address this question we
designed Experiment 2 in which, by including counterfactual feedback, we were able to sepa-
rate the influence of prediction error valence (positive vs. negative) from the influence of pre-
diction error type (chosen vs. unchosen outcome). Crucially, whereas the two competing
hypotheses (“positivity bias” vs. “confirmation bias”) predicted the same result concerning fac-
tual learning rates, they predicted opposite effects of valence on counterfactual learning rates.
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The results from Experiment 2 support the confirmation bias hypothesis: participants prefer-
entially took into account the outcomes that confirmed their current behavioural policy (posi-
tive chosen and negative unchosen outcomes) and discounted the outcomes that contradicted
it (negative chosen and positive unchosen outcomes). Our results therefore support the idea
that confirmation biases are pervasive in human cognition [25].
It should be noted that, from an orthodox Bayesian perspective, a confirmation bias would
involve reinforcing one’s own initial beliefs or preferences. Previous studies have investigated
how prior information—in the form of explicit task instructions or advice—influences the
learning of reinforcement statistics and have provided evidence of a confirmation bias [26–
28]. However, consistent with our study, their computational and neural results suggest that
this instruction-induced confirmation bias operates at the level of outcome processing and not
at the level of initial preferences or at the level of the decision-making process [29,30]. Here,
we take a slightly different perspective by extending the notion of confirmation bias to the
implicit reinforcement of one’s own current choice, by preferentially learning from desirable
outcomes, independently from explicit prior information.
We performed a learning rate analysis separately for each task condition and the results
proved robust and were not driven by any particular reward contingency condition. Our
results contrast with previous studies that have found learning rates adapt as a function of task
contingencies, showing increases when task contingencies were unstable [31,32]. Several dif-
ferences between these tasks and ours may explain this discrepancy. First, in previous studies,
the stable and unstable phases were clearly separated, whereas in our design, participants were
simultaneously tested in the three reward contingency conditions. Second, we did not explic-
itly tell participants to monitor the stability of the reward contingency. Finally, since in our
task the Reversal condition represented only one quarter of the trials, participants may not
have explicitly realised that changing learning rates were adaptive in some cases.
To date, two different views of counterfactual learning have been proposed. According to
one view, factual and counterfactual learning are underpinned by different systems that could
be computationally and anatomically mapped onto subcortical, model-free modules, and pre-
frontal, model-based modules [17,18,33]. In contrast, according to another view, factual and
counterfactual outcomes are processed by the same learning system, involving the dopaminer-
gic nuclei and their projections [34–36]. Our dimensionality reduction model comparison
result sheds new light on this debate. If the first view was correct, and factual and counterfac-
tual learning are based on different systems, different learning rates for positive and negative
prediction errors would have better accounted for the data (the ‘Information’ model). In con-
trast, our results showed that the winning model was one in which the learning process was
assumed to be different across desirable and undesirable outcomes, but shared across obtained
and forgone outcomes (as in the “Confirmation” model), This supports the second view that
factual and counterfactual learning are different facets of the same system.
Overall, we found that correct choice rate was higher in Experiment 2 than in Experiment
1, indicating that the presence of complete feedback information improved performance. Pre-
vious literature in psychology and economics suggest that this beneficial effect of counterfac-
tual information is conditional on the payoff structure of the task. Specifically, studies have
shown that the presence of rare positive outcomes could impair performance in the presence
of complete feedback [37–40]. Further research is needed to assess whether or not the learning
biases we identified extend to these payoff schemes and how they relate to the observed perfor-
mance impairment.
Another series of studies in psychology and economics have used paradigms that dissociate
information sampling (i.e., choosing an option to discover its value without getting the out-
come) from actual choice (i.e., choosing an option in order to obtain the associated outcome)
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[3]. Other paradigms have been used to investigate learning from outcomes derived from
choices performed by either a computer or another player (i.e., observational learning)
[41,42]. Future research should assess whether or not information sampling and observational
learning present similar valence-induced learning biases.
Why do these learning biases exist? One possibility is that these learning biases arise from
neurobiological constraints, which limit human learning capacity. However, we believe this
interpretation is unlikely because we see no clear reason why such limits would differentially
affect learning from positive and negative prediction errors. In other words, we would predict
that neurobiological constraints on learning rate would limit all learning rates in a similar way
and therefore not produce valence-induced learning asymmetries. A second possibility is that
these learning biases are not maladaptive. For instance, it has been shown that in certain
reward conditions agents displaying valence-induced learning biases may outperform unbi-
ased agents [9]. Thus, a possible explanation for these learning biases is that they have been
positively selected because they can be adaptive in the context of the natural environment in
which the learning system evolved [43]. A third, intermediate possibility is that these learning
biases can be maladaptive in the context of learning performance, but due to their adaptive
effects in other domains of cognition, overall they have a net adaptive value. For example,
these biases may also manifest as “self-serving”, choice-supportive biases, which result in indi-
viduals tending to ascribe success to their own abilities and efforts, but relatively tending to
neglect their own failures [44]. Accordingly, we could speculate that these learning biases may
help promote self-esteem and confidence, both of which have been associated with overall
favourable real life outcomes [45].
In summary, by investigating both factual and counterfactual learning, the current experi-
ments demonstrate that, when presented with new evidence, people tend to discard informa-
tion that suggests they have made a mistake. This selective neglect of useful information may
have adaptive value, by increasing self-confidence and self-esteem. However, this low level
reinforcement-learning bias may represent a computational building block for higher level
cognitive biases such as belief perseverance, that is, the phenomenon that beliefs are remark-
ably resilient in the face of empirical challenges that logically contradict them [46,47].
Methods
Participants
The study included two experiments. Each experiment involved N = 20 participants (Experi-
ment 1: 7 males, mean age 23.9 ± 0.7; Experiment 2: 4 males, mean age 22.8 ± 0.7). The local
ethics committee approved the study. All participants gave written informed consent before
inclusion in the study, which was carried out in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki
(1964, revised 2013). The inclusion criteria were being older than 18 years and reporting no
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders.
Behavioural tasks
Participants performed a probabilistic instrumental learning task based on previous studies
[19,20] (Fig 1A). Briefly, the task involved choosing between two cues that were presented in
fixed pairs and therefore represented fixed choice contexts. Cues were associated with station-
ary outcome probabilities in three out of four contexts. In the remaining context the outcome
probability was non-stationary. The possible outcomes were either winning or losing a point.
To allow learning, each context was presented in 24 trials. Each session comprised the four
learning contexts and therefore included 96 trials. The whole experiment involved two ses-
sions, each including the same number of contexts and conditions, but a different set of
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stimuli. Thus, the total experiment included 192 trials. The four learning contexts (i.e. fixed
pairs of cues) were divided in three conditions (S1 Fig). In the “Symmetric” condition each cue
was associated with a .50 probability of winning one point. In the “Asymmetric” condition one
cue was associated with a .75 probability of winning a point and the other cue was associated
with a .25 probability of winning a point. The Asymmetric condition was implemented in two
choice contexts in each session. Finally, in the “Reversal” condition one cue was associated with
a .83 probability of winning a point and the other cue was associated with a .17 probability of
winning a point during the first 12 trials, and these contingencies were reversed thereafter. We
chose a bigger probability difference in the Reversal compared to the Asymmetric condition in
order to ensure that participants were able to reach a plateau within the first 12 trials. Partici-
pants were encouraged to accumulate as many points as possible and were informed that some
cues would result in winning more often than others. Participants were given no explicit infor-
mation regarding reward probabilities, which they had to learn through trial and error.
At each trial, after a fixation cross, the choice context was presented. Participants made
their choice by pressing left or right arrow keys with their right hand (the choice time was self-
paced). The two experiments differed in the fact that in the Experiment 1 participants were
only informed about the outcome of their own choice (chosen outcome), whereas in the
Experiment 2 participants were informed about both the obtained and the forgone outcome
(i.e. counterfactual feedback). In Experiment 1 positive outcomes were presented at the top
and negative outcomes at the bottom of the screen. The participant was required to press the
key corresponding to the position of the outcome on the screen (top/bottom) in order to move
to the subsequent trial. In Experiment 2 the obtained outcomes were presented in the same
place as the chosen cues and the forgone outcomes in the same place as the unchosen cues. To
move to the subsequent trial, participants had to match the position of the outcome with a key
press (right/left). Importantly for our computational analyses, outcome probabilities (although
on average anti-correlated in the Asymmetric and Reversal conditions) were truly independent
across cues, so that in the Symmetric condition, in a given trial, the obtained and forgone out-
comes were the same in 50% of trials; in the Asymmetric condition this was the case in 37.5%
of trials; finally, in the Reversal condition this was the case in 28.2% of trials.
Behavioural variables
We extracted the correct response rate, that is, the rate of the trials in which the participants
chose the most rewarding response, from the Asymmetric and the Reversal conditions. The
correct response rate in the Reversal condition was calculated separately for the two phases:
before (“first half”) and after (“second half”) the contingency reversal. In the Symmetric condi-
tion, we calculated the so-called “preferred” response rate. The preferred response was defined
as the most frequently chosen option, i.e. that chosen by the participant on more than 50% of
the trials. This quantity was therefore, by definition, greater than 0.5. To investigate the beha-
vioural consequences of learning biases on performance, we median-split the participants
from each experiment into two groups according to their normalised learning rate difference
(Experiment 1: ðaþc   a
 
c Þ=ða
þ
c þ a
 
c Þ; Experiment 2: ½ða
þ
c   a
 
c Þ   ða
þ
u þ a
 
u Þ=ða
þ
c þ a
 
c þ
aþu þ a
 
u Þ), from which we obtained ‘low’ and ‘high’ bias participants[48]. The preferred
response rate in the Symmetric condition was submitted to an ANOVA with experiment (1 vs.
2) and bias level (high vs. low) as between-subjects factors. The correct choice rate in the
remaining conditions was submitted to an ANOVA with experiment (1 vs. 2) and bias level
(high vs. low) as between-subjects factors and condition (Asymmetric, Reversal first half and
Reversal second half) as within-subject factors. The effects of interest identified by the ANO-
VAs were also confirmed using Pearson’s correlations.
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Computational models
We fitted the data with a standard Q-learning model, including different learning rates follow-
ing positive and negative prediction errors and containing two different modules (Fig 1C): a
factual learning module to learn from chosen outcomes (Rc) and a counterfactual learning
module to learn from unchosen outcomes (Ru) (note that counterfactual learning applies only
to Experiment 2). For each pair of cues (choice context), the model estimates the expected val-
ues of the two options (Q-values). These Q-values essentially represent the expected reward
obtained by choosing a particular option in a given context. In both experiments, Q-values
were set at 0 before learning, corresponding to the a priori expectation of a 50% chance of win-
ning 1 point, plus a 50% chance of losing 1 point. After every trial t, the value of the chosen
option is updated according to the following rule (factual learning module):
Qc t þ 1ð Þ ¼ Qc tð Þ þ
aþc :PEcðtÞ if PEcðtÞ > 0
a c :PEcðtÞ if PEcðtÞ < 0
ð1Þ
In this first equation, PEc(t) is the prediction error of the chosen option, calculated as:
PEcðtÞ ¼ RcðtÞ   QcðtÞ; ð2Þ
where Rc(t) is the reward obtained as an outcome of choosing c at trial t. In other words, the
prediction error PEc(t) is the difference between the expected outcome Qc(t) and the actual
outcome Rc(t).
In Experiment 2 the unchosen option value is also updated according to the following rule
(counterfactual learning module):
Qu t þ 1ð Þ ¼ Qu tð Þ þ
aþu :PEuðtÞ if PEuðtÞ > 0
a u :PEuðtÞ if PEuðtÞ < 0
ð3Þ
In this second equation, PEu(t) is the prediction error of the unchosen option, calculated as:
PEuðtÞ ¼ RuðtÞ   QuðtÞ; ð4Þ
where Ru(t) is the reward that could have been obtained as an outcome of having chosen u at
trial t. In other words, the prediction error PEu(t) is the difference between the expected out-
come Qu(t) and the actual outcome Ru(t) of the unchosen option.
The learning rates aþc and a
þ
u are scaling parameters that adjust the amplitude of value
changes from one trial to the next when prediction errors of chosen and unchosen options,
respectively, are positive (when the actual reward R(t) is better than the expected reward Q(t)).
The learning rates a c and a
 
u do the same when prediction errors are negative. Thus, our
model allows for the amplitude of value updates to be different following positive and negative
prediction errors, and for both chosen and unchosen options. It therefore allows for the exis-
tence of valence-dependent learning biases.
Finally, the probability (or likelihood) of selecting the chosen option was estimated with a
soft-max rule as follows:
PcðtÞ ¼ eðQcðtÞbÞ=ðeðQcðtÞbÞ þ eðQuðtÞbÞÞ: ð5Þ
This is a standard stochastic decision rule that calculates the probability of selecting one of a
set of options according to their associated values. The temperature, β, is another scaling
parameter that adjusts the stochasticity of decision-making.
In addition to this ‘Full’ model, we also considered alternative versions with a reduced
number of learning rates (Fig 3A): the ‘Information’ model, where aþc ¼ a
 
c and a
þ
u ¼ a
 
u ; the
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‘Valence’ model, where aþc ¼ a
þ
u and a
 
c ¼ a
 
u ; and the ‘Confirmation’ model, where a
þ
c ¼ a
 
u
and a c ¼ a
þ
u . For the model comparison, we also considered a very simple model (the ‘One’)
model, with only one learning rate (aþc ¼ a
 
c ¼ a
þ
u ¼ a
 
u ), and a ‘Perseveration’ model where
an additional parameter (–Inf < π< +Inf) biases the decision-making process by increasing
(positive values) or decreasing (negative values) the likelihood of repeating the same choice,
regardless of the previous outcome (Table 1).
Parameter optimisation and model comparison
In a first analysis, we optimised model parameters by minimising the negative log-likelihood
of the data, given different parameter settings, using Matlab’s fmincon function (ranges:
0<β<Infinite, and 0< αn<1):
LL ¼ logðPðDatajModelÞÞ ð6Þ
Negative log-likelihoods (LL) were used to compute the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) at the individual level (random effects) for each model, as follows:
BIC ¼ logðntrialsÞ  df þ 2  LL ð7Þ
BIC were compared between biased and unbiased models to verify that the utilisation of the
biased model was justified, even accounting for its extra-complexity. As an approximation of the
model evidence, individual BICs were fed into the mbb-vb-toolbox [49], a procedure that esti-
mates the exceedance probability and the model attributions for each model within a set of mod-
els, given the data gathered from all participants. Exceedance probability (denoted XP) is the
probability that a given model fits the data better than all other models in the set, i.e. has the high-
est XP (Table 1). The toolbox also allows the estimation of the individual model attributions, i.e.
the posterior probability (PP), for each subject, of belonging to each model. The individual
model attributions can be compared to chance (defined as 1/the total number of models), com-
pared to each other, and can also be averaged to obtain the model frequency for the population.
In a second analysis, we optimised model parameters by minimising the logarithm of the
Laplace approximation to the model evidence (or log posterior probability: LPP):
LPP ¼ logðPðDatajModel; ParametersÞÞ ð8Þ
Because LPP maximisation includes priors over the parameters (temperature: gamma(1.2,5);
learning rates beta(1.1,1.1)) [50], it avoids degenerate parameter estimates. Therefore, learning
rate analyses have been performed on the values retrieved with this procedure. To avoid bias in
learning rate comparisons, the same priors were used for all learning rates. In the main analysis, a
single set of parameters was used to fit all conditions. In a control analysis, different sets of param-
eters were used to fit each condition (“Symmetric”, “Asymmetric” and “Reversal”).
Parameter correlation and parameter recovery
To validate our results, and more specifically to verify that valence-induced differences in
learning rates reflected true differences in learning, as opposed to an artefact of the parameter
optimisation procedure, we checked the correlations between the free parameters (Experiment
1: β, aþc ; a
 
c ; Experiment 2: β, αCON, αDIS) and the capacity of recovering the correct parame-
ters using simulated datasets. To check the capacity of recovering the correct parameters using
simulated datasets, we simulated performance on our behavioural task using virtual partici-
pants with parameters values corresponding to those retrieved from our experimental partici-
pants [23]. We simulated N = 100 virtual experiments.
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Supporting information
S1 Fig. Stability of learning biases across task conditions. (A) Task conditions. The ‘Sym-
metric’ condition was characterised by a stable reward contingency and no correct option,
because the two options had equal reward probabilities. The ‘Asymmetric condition’ was also
characterised by a stable reward contingency and a correct option, since one option had a
higher reward probability than the other. The ‘Reversal’ condition was characterised by an
instable reward contingency: after 12 trials the reward probability reversed across symbols, so
that the former correct option became the incorrect one, and vice versa. Note that the number
of trials refers to one session and participants performed two sessions, each involving new
pairs of stimuli (192 trials in total). (B) and (C) Computational results as a function of the task
conditions in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, respectively. Each column presents the result of
the corresponding condition presented in (A).
(EPS)
S2 Fig. Parameter recovery in Experiment 1. “True values”: learning rates used to simulate
the data. “Recovered values”: learning rates obtained from the simulations once the same
parameter optimisation was applied as for the experimental data. “Case: unbiased”: no learning
rate bias. “Case: biased”: positivity learning rate bias.
(EPS)
S3 Fig. Parameter recovery in Experiment 2. “True values”: learning rates used to simulate
the data. “Recovered values”: learning rates obtained from the simulations once the same
parameter optimisation was applied as for the experimental data. “Case: unbiased”: no learning
rate bias. “Case: semi-biased”: learning rate bias only concerning factual learning. “Case
biased”: confirmation bias involving both factual and counterfactual learning.
(EPS)
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